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Abstract:  
 
 
A structural model is used in this paper to analyze the demand and learning behavior in cell 
phone market. We assume that the cell phone consumption can be divided into a high-value part 
and a low-value part. The consumers are assumed to be uncertain about the exogenous shock of 
the need for high-value usage and also their preferences over the low-value usage. Meanwhile, we 
assume that the consumers’ knowledge improves over time. As a result, the match between their 
plan choice and consumption pattern becomes better. Such a learning behavior is supported by 
the data set. Bayesian updating is used to represent the learning. The estimates of the parameters 
are obtained and compared to the benchmarks from previous research.   
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1. Introduction 
 
The major purpose of this paper is to empirically analyze the demand and 
consumers’ learning behavior in the cell phone market, using a panel data set from a large 
provider in Asia. Cell phone consumption is special for two important reasons. First, it is 
a two-stage decision problem with uncertainty. In most cases, the consumer has to choose 
a fee schedule and then decides how many minutes to call. Since the final payment is 
based on the number of minutes used and the chosen plan, a rational consumer needs to 
predict the usage when choosing a plan. However, the prediction is rarely accurate and 
the chosen plan might not be optimal ex-post. This is similar to the health (and other) 
insurance market. On the other hand, the consumer may not be completely clear about her 
own preference (utility function). This is particularly true if cell phone is a relatively new 
product in the market. In this paper, we develop a structural model that accounts for the 
sequential decision and both sources of uncertainty.   
Second, under different situations, the consumer may value the cell phone usage 
differently. Emergency calls could be of much higher value than regular chatting. 
Therefore, at the same consumption level, the marginal utility derived from each 
additional minute could differ due to the different purpose of calling. Our model 
explicitly accounts for this difference by separating the total usage into two parts, the 
high-value part and the low-value (normal-value) part.   
We assume the following scenario. The need for high-value usage is random 
and exogenously driven and the consumer uses exactly the number of high-value minutes 
that she needs. The consumer’s preference over the low-value minutes is indexed by two 
key parameters in the utility function, one of which is assumed to be uncertain. At the 
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first stage, the consumer chooses a plan based on her prediction of the need for high-
value usage and her prior belief of the preference over low-value usage. After the plan is 
chosen, she receives a signal on her preference and updates her belief. The posterior 
belief of the preference is used in the utility maximization, which leads to the demand for 
low-value usage. Then, the need for high-value usage is realized for that period and the 
consumer updates her prediction of the next period high-value usage. This procedure 
repeats in each period, beginning with the updated prediction and belief from the 
previous period. The dynamic learning behavior is captured by the two updating 
structures, both following the Bayes’s rule. The time dimension of the panel data has 
enabled us to examine the learning empirically.   
Our approach builds upon previous research mainly from two lines, the 
literature of telecommunication demand modeling (Train, et al 1987, Kling and Ploeg 
1991, Park, et al 1991, and Sung and Lee 2002), and that of consumer learning 
(McFadden and Train 1996, Miravete 2002a, Ackerberg 2003, and Clay, et al 2004). To 
our knowledge, this paper is the first empirical analysis of cell phone demand with 
consumer learning. Two recent articles are closely related to our research. Telang (2004) 
uses the same data set to estimate a demand model, but that paper does not consider the 
consumers’ learning behavior and the utility function is assumed to be deterministic. 
Miravete (2003) models consumers’ learning in the traditional land line phone service, 
using a data set from the 1986 Kentucky experiment. The current paper contributes 
primarily to the understanding of the consumer side in the emerging cell phone market. 
We observe a significant level of learning behavior in the data, which motivates our 
structural model.  
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In Telang (2004), the author reports a much higher level of price elasticity for 
the cell phone users, as compared to the results from the previous research on land line 
phone services. We ask the question whether the demand for cell phone is still highly 
elastic under the learning model and compare our results to the benchmarks from the 
previous literature. More generally, we hope this paper would add new empirical 
knowledge to the telecommunication demand and consumer learning. Besides, the 
separation of high-value and low value usage in the utility function seems to be a new 
treatment in the literature. The data are collected from a large cell phone service provider 
in Asia. The company certainly has some market power, but it is far from being a 
monopoly in the market. Due to the lack of information on the major competitors in that 
region, we do not consider strategic pricing behavior of the firm and thus ignore the 
question of optimal tariff design and its possible interaction with the consumers. 
Although our model focuses on the consumer’s learning about preferences and 
exogenous shock, it can be extended to accommodate learning about product quality.     
The next section discusses the data and the motivation for our model. Section 3 
explains the details of the demand model, followed by the empirical specification and 
estimation in section 4. The final section discusses the results and concludes the paper.   
 
2. Data and Preliminary Analysis 
The data set used in this study comes from a large wireless service provider in 
Asia. The original data include about 10,000 subscribers over 12 months. However, due 
to missing observations, the initial test period (the first two months), and the promotional 
plan offered to some special groups of consumers, the final sample we use includes 6625 
 4
subscribers over 10 months (from March to December). The company offers five regular 
cell phone plans, with a fixed fee and a certain number of free minutes associated with 
each one. A same per minute price is charged for all usage above the free minutes. The 
table below, adapted from Telang (2004), describes all those plans.  
 
Plan Name Code Monthly Fee Free Minutes Overtime Charge 
ORANGE2000   Plan 1 2000 2117 3 per minute  
ORANGE1500 Plan 2 1500 1217 3 per minute 
ORANGE1100   Plan 3 1100 817 3 per minute 
ORANGE800  Plan 4 800 517 3 per minute 
PIONEER    Plan 5 350 233 3 per minute 
 
All the consumers in our sample had stayed with the company for the whole 
period and their plan choices and voice usage. The data record their plan choices and the 
number of minutes used for each period. Besides, some of the consumer characteristics 
are also observed. The table below summarizes the data month by month.  
    
Variable Description Mean Standard Deviation 
age Age of the subscriber 33.1 7.04 
gd 1=female; 0=male 0.54 0.498 
rs 1=owned; 0=other 0.27 0.441 
mr 1=married; 0=other 0.28 0.447 
Plan1 5.00 0 
Plan2 5.0003 0.05 
Plan3 4.96 0.29 
Plan4 4.93 0.37 
Plan5 4.92 0.40 
Plan6 4.91 0.42 
Plan7 4.91 0.42 
Plan8 4.91 0.45 
Plan9 4.90 0.46 
plan10 
 
 
 
Plan chosen in the Month 
4.90 0.47 
Voice1 416.03 335.96 
Voice2 373.28 275.28 
Voice3 257.88 217.59 
Voice4 
 
 
 
Minutes used in the month 
267.72 308.20 
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Voice5 249.63 248.98 
Voice6 273.77 245.56 
Voice7 276.51 240.73 
Voice8 269.21 240.16 
Voice9 272.67 233.80 
Voice10 
 
276.02 232.49 
 
Two trends are noticeable from the table. First, the average number of minutes used 
declined sharply during the first three months. Second, the plan choices diversified over the 
time, although the majority of the consumers had chosen the basic plan all the time. (The 
basic plan was the only plan offered in the beginning, and therefore, all consumers chose 
the same plan during the first month. Starting from the second month, all plans were on the 
menu.) It seems that the consumers were making adjustment of both their plan choices and 
their consumption behavior over time. While many of them reduced the usage to match the 
basic plan, some of them switched to higher plans to match their consumption.  
In the table below, we find the “ideal plan” for each consumer conditional on 
the voice usage of that month and then calculate the distance between the real payment and 
the optimal payment. 
                
Deviation from Optimal Payment Mean Standard Deviation 
Month 1 176.7174 389.129 
Month 2 97.45377 285.3432 
Month 3 26.33237 162.9723 
Month 4 34.99516 219.36 
Month 5 35.23877 195.15 
Month 6 34.93534 179.4459 
Month 7 35.49614 176.1575 
Month 8 30.43516 164.8827 
Month 9 33.42444 174.5696 
Month 10 33.48186 168.6575 
  
It is clear that the deviation from the optimal payment shrinks quickly over the first three 
months. After that, it stays relatively stable. The possible intuition could be twofold. 
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First, for those consumers who did deviate from the optimal payment, they tend to 
“learn” when the deviation is large. Second, those consumers can only correct their 
“mistakes” up to certain extent. There might be some uncontrollable random factors that 
prevent them from being optimal ex post.  
Next, we look at the proportion of consumers who actually did choose the 
optimal plan in the month.  
             
Optimal Plan Choice 
1=optimal; 0=non-optimal 
Mean 
Month 1 0.72 
Month 2 0.77 
Month 3 0.94 
Month 4 0.93 
Month 5 0.93 
Month 6 0.92 
Month 7 0.92 
Month 8 0.92 
Month 9 0.92 
Month 10 0.91 
 
Obviously, the number of consumers choosing the best plan increased rapidly during the 
first two months. This is consistent with the previous table. Both tables have suggested 
that the consumers were learning to improve the match between their plan choices and 
cell phone usage. Moreover, the learning behavior can be separated into two types, plan 
switching and usage adjustment. This motivates the demand model that we will discuss in 
the next section.  
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3. The Demand Model and Learning   
   
3.1 Utility, Demand and Plan Choice - the Basic Model:  
Following the literature of telecommunication demand analysis, we model the 
consumer behavior as a two-stage sequential decision problem. During the first stage, a 
consumer chooses a calling plan based on her prediction of the number of minutes she 
will call. Then, after the uncertainty is resolved, the consumer maximizes her utility by 
deciding how many minutes to use.  
Calling plans are indexed by k, and are described by ( )kkk pgT ,, , where 
and are the fixed monthly fee, the free minutes allowed and the per-minute rate 
above the free minutes for plan k. Consumer’s preference is represented by the utility 
function
kk gT , kp
( ) 21 1, ( )
2
U M C M M C
b
θ= − + , where M is the total number of cell phone 
minutes consumed and C is the composite good representing everything else with unit 
price. Notice that the utility function is quasi-linear in C and quadratic in M.  
 
We deal with this discrete-continuous choice problem recursively, a typical 
approach in the related literature. Conditional on the choice of a calling plan k in the first 
stage, a consumer’s utility maximization problem of the second stage is the following:  
                                                 
,M C
Max  ( ),U M C   
Subject to the budget constraint: ( )k kC p M g Tω+ − = −  
Where ω is consumer’s income and . 0{
k k
k
p if M g
if M g
p
>
≤=
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 Notice that the budget constraint is non-linear, due to the free minutes offered 
under each plan. However, it is convex and piecewise linear, with the form below:  
 
 M
C
                      kg
    
Substitute the budget constraint into the objective function, the utility 
maximization problem becomes:  
                              
m
Max   21 1( ) (
2 k
) kM M p M gb
θ ω T− + − − −       
                                         0{
k k
k
p if M g
if M g
p
>
≤=
Depending on the value ofθ , the first order conditions are:  
                   1 ( ) 0k
U M p
M b
θ∂ = − − =∂ { k
k
   
M g
p p
if
>
=  
                                  1 ( )U M
M b
θ∂ = − =∂ 0             0{
kM g
p
if
≤
= ,  
               And they imply the following demand equations:  
                                  kM bpθ= −       if kg bpkθ > +      (3.1a) 
                                  M θ=                if kgθ ≤       (3.1b) 
                                  kM g=              if k kg g kbpθ< ≤ +                                          (3.1c) 
                         
 9
The above equations are intuitive. After a plan has been chosen and the monthly 
fee has b
Back to the first stage, the consumer need to choose a plan based on the 
demand eq
   
               
een paid, if the satiation point is high enough (3.1a), the optimal consumption 
will be above the free minutes and up to the point where the marginal utility is equal to 
the marginal (per-minute) price. If the satiation point is lower than the number of free 
minutes (3.1b), the consumption should reach the satiation point and stop exactly there. If 
the satiation point is higher than the number of free minutes, but the marginal utility after 
the free minutes is lower than the marginal price (3.1c), the consumer should use up all 
the free minute but no more.  
 
uations derived above, which lead to the following indirect utility function:  
 
 
2
2
2
1 1     if    (3.2a)  
2 2
1( , , )           if                                         (3.2b)
2
1 1          if             (3.2c)
2
k k k k k k k
k k k k k
k k k k k k
p bp g p T g bp
b
W g T p T g
b
g g T g g bp
b b
θ θ ω θ
θ ω θ
θ ω θ
⎧ − + + − + > +⎪
= − + ≤⎨
− − + < ≤ +
 
⎪⎪
⎪⎪⎪⎩
              
Suppose the consumer has perfect knowledge of θ and b, then she would simply 
choose a plan with the combination of , ,  and  k k kg T p that gives her the highest indirect 
utility at the first stage. Clearly, assum tant and taking , ,  and  k k kg T p as ing b is cons
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given, the choice of plan depends on the value ofθ . Here, t of 
, ,  and  k k kg T p across the plans is critical. Ideally, we would like the ranking of the plans 
e in
he ordering 
to be monoton θ . This means for each consumer, the fixed fee and the number of 
minutes of her pre rred plan will increase as her satiation point gets higher. Such a 
ranking would be guaranteed by the following three conditions. The per-minute 
price k
fe
p p≡ is constant for all plans; for any two plans k and j, it is always the case 
that kT T  and only if k jg g> ; and finally, the ratio /k kT g (the per-minute price of free 
minutes) decreases in kT lways below k
j> if
and is a p . The fi ular plans in our data satisfy 
those conditions and the above indirect utility function implies a set of threshold values:     
                                        0 1 2, , ...
ve reg
           
Kθ θ θ θ                                                              
Those va nsumer klues guarantee that the co  choose plan k if and only if 1kθ θ− ≤ ≤will θ . 
.  Telang (2004) has details on the derivation of the specific values for our data
Sinceθ is not observed by the econometrician, the above threshold values, 
together with th  distributional assumption one θ , would allow us to estimate an ordered 
probit (or logit) model with maximum likeliho d, as in Telang (2004). In the following 
section, we take a different approach by assuming that the consumer is uncertain about 
her satiation point when choosing the plan. 
 
o
3.2 Two-part Consumption - the Extended Model:  
 assumes that the consumer treats 
all the voice mi e manner when maximizing utility. It means at any given 
 
The basic model discussed above implicitly
nutes in the sam
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consumption level, the marginal utility of each additional minute, whatever the purpose 
of calling, is the same. This is inconsistent with what actually happens in real life. Most 
subscribers use cell phone for many different purposes, and the marginal utility of each 
additional minute could potentially depend on its function. The consumer may put very 
high value on certain types of usage (e.g. family emergency, change of schedule or 
canceling appointment) and relatively low value on others. Moreover, in most cases, it 
could be hard to predict in advance how many high-value minutes a consumer will need 
in the next period. To formalize this idea, we extend the basic model by decomposing the 
total number of used minutes into two parts, the high-value minutes ( hM ) and the low-
value minutes ( lM ). We assume the consumer has the following utility function:  
( ) 2( ) 1 12h h b, , [ ( ) ( ) ]h l h M l l h l hU M M C VM I M M M M Cθ θ≤= + + − + +             (3.3) 
Wher
                
e ( )h hMI θ≤ is an indicator function and hθ is a parameter reflecting the 
number of high-value minutes the consumer needs. Notice that the above utility function 
has a coup tures. le of fea First, if the value of “V” is high enough, then upon observing hθ , 
the consumer will always choose hM equal to hθ , but not more than hθ , regardless of the 
plan choice and the consumption of lM . Intuitively, this means that the consumer will use 
exactly the number of high-value m tes she n ds. Second, at the optimum, an increase 
in h
inu ee
M will generally reduce lM , since the marginal utility of the low-value minutes is 
decreasing. This is particularly true if the total number of minutes has reached the 
sat ion point in the second m of the utility function.  
Consider the following scenario: after choosing a plan, the consumer has to 
choose l
iat ter
M first and then observe hθ and finally choose M . With the above structure, the h
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consumer’s utility maximization now becomes a three-stage decision problem. 
Recursively, we start from the final stage. After observing hθ , the consumer decides hM , 
which will always be equal to hθ , due to our assumption on V. For almost all consumers, 
the phone bill usually comprises only a small proportion of the income; hence i s 
reasonable to assume that the t al number of minutes ( )l h
 t i
ot M M+ is always strictly inside 
the budget constraint. At the second stage, if the consumer knows her hθ , then the 
problem becomes the following:  
( )                21 1: , | [ ( ) ( ) ]
l( , )
l h h l l h l hM C 2
Max U M C V M M Cθ θ θ θ θ
b
= + + − + +  
Subject to the budget constraint: k( )l h kC p M g Tθ ω+ + − = −  
Where ω is consumer’s income and
Substitute the budget constraint into the objective function, the utility 
maximiza
0{
l h
l h
k k
k
p if M g
if M g
p
θ
θ
+
+
>
≤= . 
tion problem becomes:  
( ) 21 1[ ( ) ( ) ] ( )l h l l h l h l h k k( ) : 2lMMax U b
 Where 
The first order conditions are:  
                   
M V M M p M g Tθ θ θ θ ω θ= + + − + + − + − −       
0{
l h
l h
k k
k
p if M g
if M g
p
θ
θ
+
+
>
≤=  
1 ( ) 0l h l k
dU M p
dM b
θ θ= − − − =      { l h
k
kM g
p p
if
θ+ >
=  
l
1 ( )l h l
l
dU M
dM b
θ θ= − − = 0               0{
l h kM g
p
if
θ+ ≤
=                   ,  
And they lead to the following demand equations:  
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                                  kl l hM bpθ θ= − −        if kl kg bpθ > +       
              hl lM θ θ= −                 if l kgθ ≤                                               
                                  l k hM g θ= −                if kbpk l kg gθ< ≤ +                                
e, the consumer
      
                         
Back to the first stag  chooses a plan based on the demand equations 
derived above, which lead to the following indirect utility function:  
           
2
2
2
1 1
2 2
1
b
⎧
⎪⎪
       if                     
( , , )                                          if                            
2
1 1    
2
h l l k k k k k l k k
k k l k l k
h l k k k
V p bp g p T g bp
W g T p V T g
b
V g g T
b b
θ θ θ ω θ
θ θ ω θ
θ θ ω
+ − + + − + > +
= + − + ≤
+ − − +                          if            k l k kg g bpθ
⎪
⎨
< ≤ +⎪⎩
 
Suppose the consumer knows 
k h⎪⎪
and hθlθ , then she would simply choose a plan 
with the combination of that gives her the highest indirect utility at the 
first stage. Based on above equations, the choice of plan obviously depends on the value 
of
 , ,  and  k k kg T p
lθ . Similar to the basic model in the previous section, the five regular plans in our data 
and the above indirect utility function implies a set of threshold values:                
                                        0 1 2, , ...l l l lKθ θ θ θ                                                          (3.4) 
Those values guarantee that the consumer will choose plan k if and only if , 1l k l lkθ θ θ− ≤ ≤ . 
 
 
.3 Uncertainty and Learning about Preference:  
Up to now, our model assumes that the consumer knows her preference with 
ertainty (i.e. all the parameters in the utility function). The data suggest otherwise, 
 
3
c
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however. We observe that over time, particularly during the first two months, many 
consumers have substantially shortened the distance between their actual payment and 
the ideal payment (or consumption, depending on perspective) in theory. It seems that 
those consumers are uncertain about their preferences but their knowledge improves over 
time. Notice that although hθ is a parameter in the utility function, it can be interpreted as 
an exogenous shock, since it represents the number of high-value minutes a consumer 
needs during that period. With that in mind, we consider the following learning behavior: 
the consumer is uncertain about both lθ and hθ . At the first stage, she chooses a plan based 
on her initial beliefs of those two parameters. Then she observes a signal on lθ and 
updates her belief of it. The consumption of low-value minutes is based on the updated 
belief of lθ and the initial belief of hθ . Then, at the third stage, hθ is realized and the 
consumer chooses hM equal to the realized hθ and updates her belief of it. For each 
period, the consumer repeats this procedure, using the updated beliefs from the last 
period as t  initial beliefs of the curre t period.  
Following the common approach in the consumer learning literature, as shown 
in Clay, Goettler and Wolff (2004), we assume the learning is represented by Bayesian 
updating. The uncertainty of l
he n
θ  is characterized by a normal distribution with mean lμ , 
which is unknown and variance 2lσ , which is known. At the beginning of the first period, 
the consumer has a prior distribution on lμ , which is also normal with mean 0lμ and 
variance 20lσ . Similarly, we e that  assum hθ  is also normal, with unknown mean hμ  and 
known variance 2hσ . The consumer has a normal prior on hμ , with mean 0hμ and 
variance 20hσ .  
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W stith the normal prior, after observing the signals ts  (t=1, 2…T), the po erior 
distribution of lμ at time “t” is also normal, with mean ltμ and variance 2ltσ . Similarly, the 
realizations of hθ , tr  (t=1, 2…T-1), lead to the posterior distribution of hμ , with mean htμ  
and variance 2htσ . To summarize:  
lθ ~ 2( , )l lN μ σ :                             The distribution of l   θ , ith unknown w lμ and known 2lσ ; 
lμ ~ 20 0( ,l lN )μ σ                                                              The prior distrib ion of l:  ut μ at t=0; 
1 2, ... Ts s s :                                          The signals observed by the consumer at each period; 
l 1 2( | , ... )ts s sμ ~ 2( , )lt ltN μ σ :                       The posterior distribution of lf at each period; μ
2 2
t
s0 0l i l l
                 Where          12 2
0
i
lt
l lt
σ μ σ+∑
μ σ σ= +                    (3.5a) 
=
                 and              
2 2
2 σ σ0
2 2
0
l l
lt
l lt
σ σ σ= +         (3.5b) 
      
 
                 (t=1, 2…T)   
2, )h hσ :                              The distribution of hθ , with unknown hμ and known 2hσ ; ~ N (hθ μ
~ ( ,N 20 0 )h hμ σ :                                                            The prior distribution of hμ hμ at t=0; 
      The realizations of1 2 1, ... Tr r r − :  hθ  observed by the consumer at the end of each period; 
| , ...h T1 2 1( )r r rμ − ~ 2( , )ht htN μ σ :  The posterior distribution of hμ at the en  of each peri ; f d od
2 2
t
r
                 Where          
0 0h i h h
ht
1
2 2
0
i
h ht
σ μ σ+∑
μ σ σ
== +                    (3.6a) 
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                 and              
2 2
2 0h hσ σσ 2 2
0
ht
h htσ σ+         (3.6b) =
                 (t=1, 2…T, and the learning of hθ  is one period lagg
Notice there is a slight difference between our assumptions on the learning of 
the two et 
ed.)       
parameters. We interpr hθ as an exog
about its distribution. The consumption of high-value minutes depends on the realization 
of this random variable in each period. On the other hand, 
enous shock and the consumer learns 
lθ is considered the true 
satiation point, but the consumer never knows it for sure. Therefore, although the learning 
is also about its distribution, she uses the posterior belief to choose the consumption of 
low-value minutes. When choosing the plan in the first stage, the prior distributions of 
both parameters are used.  
With the above learning structure, for each period “t” the consumer chooses 
hM = , the realization oftr hθ at time “t”. Back to the second stage, the consumer 
lMmaximizes the expected utility by choosing :  (strictly speaking, it is the expectation of 
the expected utility.) Assuming lθ and hθ are independent and using the current beliefs at 
time t s “ ”, the problem become  the following:  
( ) 2
( )
: [ ( ) ( ) ] ( )
lt
lt h l lt h lt h lt h k kM
1 1
2
Max EU M E V M M p M g T
b
θ θ θ θ ω θ⎧ ⎫= + + − + + − + − −⎨ ⎬⎩ ⎭
   =
      
2 2 21 1
2b, 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1
[( ) ( 2 )] ( )h t lt lt lt h t lt l h t h t h t lt h t k kV M M M p M g Tμ μ μ μ μ μ σ ω μ− − − − − −+ + − + + + + − + − −  
Where the “expected price”
, 1
, 10
{ lt h t
lt h t
k k
k
p if M g
if M g
p
μ
μ
−
−
+
+
>
≤=  
The first order conditions are:  
 17
, 1
1 ( ) 0lt h t lt k
l
dU M p
b
μ μ −− − − =      
, 1{ lt h t
k
kM g
p p
i
μ −+ >
=  f                   dM =
                   , 1
1 ( )dU = − 0lt h t lt
l
M
dM b
μ μ − − =               
, 1
0{
l t h t kM g
p
if
μ −+ ≤
= ,  
And they imply the following demand equations:  
                                  , 1lt lt h t kM bpμ μ −= − −      if lt k kg bpμ > +     (3.7a) 
                                  , 1lt lt h tM μ μ −= −               if lt kgμ ≤                      (3.7b) 
                                  , 1lt k h tM g μ −= −               if kbpk lt kg gμ< ≤ +                       (3.7c) 
 
It is important to notice that at each period “t”, while the consumer knows 
ltμ and observes tr af ltM , none ter she chooses of those values are observed by the 
econometrician separately. For each period, what we observe in the data is *tM the total 
consum consumption of high-value minutesption ex post. Since the htM  is always equal 
e current realizatio , the equation to th n tr
*
tM = lt tM r+ must hold all periods. Therefore, 
the above demand equations (3.7a, 3.7b and 3.7c) imply the following:  
                               k
*
, 1t lt h t tM r bpμ μ −= − + −      if lt k kg bpμ > +     (3.8a) 
                               * , 1t lt h t tM rμ −      fμ= − +          i kg lt ≤μ                       (3.8b) 
                               , 1t k h t t
*M g rμ −= − +               if k lt k kg g bpμ< ≤ +                       (3.8c) 
 
To comp der the consum  choice of the plans in the lete the model, we consi er’s
nownfirst stage. With unk and hθ ,lθ  at g of each period,  
utility under plan k is
the beginnin the expected indirect
: ( , , )t k k kE W g T p  
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, 1 , 1 , 1 , 1
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, 1 , 1
1 1( ) ( )       if 
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1 ( )                                         if  
2
1 1            
2
h t l t l t k k l t k l t k k
h t l t l t k l t k
h t l t k k k
V p g b T g
b
V T g
b
V g g T
b b
μ μ σ μ ω μ
μ μ σ ω μ
μ μ ω
− − − − −
− − − −
− −
+ + + + − − + > +
+ + − + ≤
+ − − + , 1                             if  k l t kg gμ −
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪ < ≤ +⎪⎩
bp
kbp
 
At the first stage, the consumer chooses a plan that gives her the highest indirect utility at 
the first stage based on above equations, which lead to the same set of threshold values 
we derived previously 0 1 2, , ...l l l lKθ θ θ θ  (3.4). Those values guarantee that the consumer 
chooses plan k if and only if , 1 , 1l k l t lkθ μ θ− −≤ ≤ . 
This concludes the theoretical part of the paper. The essential results of the 
demand and learning model are the threshold values (3.4), the equations (3.5a), (3.5b), 
(3.6a), (3.6b), (3.8a), (3.8b) and (3.8c), which we take to the data in the next section.   
 
4. Estimation  
   
4.1 Empirical Specification:  
First, notice that the preference signals of lθ , and the realizations of1 2, ... Ts s s hθ , 
are deterministic for each consumer at each period (they are assumed to be 
observed by the consumer without error). However, those values are not observed by us 
and are stochastic from our perspective. We assume both sets are i.i.d. random variables 
with normal distribution across the population: 
1 2 1, ... Tr r r −
ts ~ . . .i i d
2( , )s sN μ σ              (t=1, 2…T)                  (4.1a) 
tr ~ . . .i i d
2( , )r rN μ σ      (t=1, 2…T-1)       (4.1b) 
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The same situation applies to the two prior means 0lμ and 0hμ , as the cell phone user 
knows them while we do not. We make the simplifying assumption that 0lμ is constant 
across all users. Since the data show the same plan choice during the first month for all 
users, this assumption might not be too restrictive. Meanwhile, 0hμ is also assumed to be 
normally distributed across the population: 
                                            0hμ ~ 2( , )p pN μ σ                  (4.1c) 
We make another simplifying assumption that all the variance terms involved in the 
Bayesian updating ( 2hσ , 20hσ , 2lσ and 20lσ ) are constant for all users. Our goal is to estimate 
the structural parameter b, which measures the slope of the demand curve, and all the 
parameters associated with the learning behavior.   
The above specification (4.1a), (4.1b), and (4.1c), combined with (3.5a) and 
(3.6a) from the previous section, implies that the current beliefs (the posterior means) of 
each period, ltμ and htμ are also random variables, both with normal distribution across 
the population:  
 ltμ ~ 2( , )lt ltN υ τ  and htμ ~ 2( , )ht htN υ τ  
Where ltυ =
2 2
0 0
2 2
0
l s l l
l l
t
t
σ μ μ σ
σ σ
+
+ , and 
2
ltτ =
22
20
2 2
0
l
s
l l
t
t
σ σσ σ
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠                                            (4.2a) 
           htυ =
2 2
0
2 2
0
h r p h
h h
t
t
σ μ μ σ
σ σ
+
+ , and 
2
htτ =
2 22 2
2 20
2 2 2 2
0 0
h h
r p
h h h h
t
t t
σ σσ σσ σ σ σ
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞+⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟+ +⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠           (4.2b) 
Similarly, following the equations (3.8a), (3.8b) and (3.8c), the total consumption ex post 
*
tM  is also normally distributed, with mean and variance depending on the value of ltμ . 
LetΦ denote the standard normal CDF andφ the corresponding PDF:  
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* ,( )( | )
( )
lt h t t k
t lt k k
lt k k
1f r bpf M g bp
P g bp
μ μμ μ
−− + −> + = > +  =    
*
1
1
1
t m
m
k k lt
lt
M
g bp
μφ σ
υ
τ
⎛ ⎞−⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎞+ −−Φ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
            (4.3a) 
(Where 1mμ = , 1lt h t r kbpυ υ μ−− + − , and 21mσ = 2 2lt ht r2τ τ σ+ + ) 
* , 1( )( | )
( )
lt h t t
t lt k
lt k
*
2
2
t m
m
k lt
lt
M
g
μφ σ
υ
τ
⎛ ⎞−⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎞−Φ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
f r
f M g
P g
μ μμ μ
−− +≤ = ≤  =                                              (4.3b) 
 
(Where 2mμ = , 1lt h t rυ υ −− + μ , and 2 2mσ = 2 2lt ht r2τ τ σ+ + ) 
 
*( | )t k lt k kf M g g bpμ< ≤ + = , 1( )( )
k h t t
k lt k k
f g r
P g g bp
 =
*
3
3
t m
m
k k lt k lt
lt lt
M
g bp g
μφ σ
υ υ
τ τ
⎛ ⎞−⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎞ ⎛+ − −Φ −Φ⎜ ⎟ ⎜⎝ ⎠ ⎝
μ
μ
−− +
< ≤ + ⎞⎟⎠
     (4.3c)           
 
(Where 3mμ = , 1k h tg rυ μ−− + , and 2 3mσ = 2 2ht rτ σ+ ) 
 
 
4.2 The Maximum Likelihood Estimation: 
 
 
In the data, we observe the plan choice and the total consumption for each 
consumer during each period. Assuming the decisions of the consumers are mutually 
independent, the joint probability of the observed plan choices and total consumptions for 
N consumers during T periods is simply the product of the individual probabilities. This 
leads us to the following likelihood function:  
   L (γ | plans, consumptions) = 
1 1
T N
t n= =
∏∏  [ 1( | )ntP plan k γ= · * 2( | , )n tp M plan kγ = ]         (4.4) 
Whereγ is vector of the parameters we want to estimate; 1γ and 2γ are the two 
subsets ofγ that affect the plan choice probability and the consumption probability 
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respectively. Subscript t indexes time periods and subscript n indexes consumers. Based 
on the results of the previous section, for consumer n at time t, the probability of plan 
choice is the following:  
 1( | )ntP plan k γ= , 1 , 1( )l k l t lkP= μ θ− −≤ ≤ = , 1 , 1 , 1
, 1 , 1
lk l t l k l t
l t l t
θ υ θ υ
τ τ
− −
− −
⎛ ⎞ ⎛− −Φ −Φ⎜ ⎟ ⎜⎜ ⎟ ⎜⎝ ⎠ ⎝
− ⎞⎟⎟⎠
          (4.5) θ
Where denotes the standard normal CDF; Φ , 1l tυ − and , 1l tτ − correspond with (4.2a). The 
probability (density) of the observed total consumption for consumer n at time t, 
conditional on the chosen plan, is the following: * 2( | ,n t )p M planγ k=  
          = *( | )t lt k kf M g bμ > + *( |t lt kp + )M gμ ≤ *( | )t k lt k k+ f M g g bpμ< ≤ +                 (4.6) f
The right-hand side corresponds with (4.3a), (4.3b) and (4.3c) derived above. The 
parameters are estimated by maximizing the log-likelihood function based on (4.4).   
 
4.3 The Effect of Observed Consumer Heterogeneity:  
To incorporate the observed consumer characteristics, we assume those 
covariates shift the prior mean of low-value minutes. Thus, for a consumer with 
characteristics iX  , his or her prior distribution of low value minute becomes the 
following: lθ ~ 2( , )l lN μ σ  and lμ ~ 20( ,l i lN X 0 )μ β σ+ . Based on the structure of our 
model, the consumer characteristics could in principle affect several different aspects of 
demand and learning. Besides the prior mean of low value minutes, they may shift the 
prior mean of high-value minutes or prior variances (and thus, the posterior variances). It 
is not hard to imagine that the consumers are heterogeneous in the effectiveness (speed) 
of learning. However, to identify those effects separately would be hard. The assumption 
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we make is reasonable, since the low value usage should be the part that the consumers 
have the best knowledge, and therefore, the part that might be best explained by the 
observed characteristics. 
The covariates that we include in the model are age, gender, residence type 
and marital status. The data actually contains more variables. Some of them have very 
little variation, such as payment type and account type. The other two variables that we 
do not use are Short Message Service and Web Access usage. It would be hard to treat 
them as exogenous, since both of them are decision variables from the perspective of the 
consumers. On the other hand, the model would have been much complicated if we 
include them as endogenous variables. In our data, the usages of SMS and WAP are very 
low compared to the voice minutes. Hence their exclusion from the model should not 
substantially affect the results.   
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5. Results and Discussions 
 
The point estimates and the standard deviations of the parameter are reported 
in the table below.  
Parameters Point Estimates Standard Deviations 
b 58.9 (**) 8.7 
0lμ  345.6 22.3 
2
0lσ  129.7 16.4 
2
lσ  201.4 28.3 
pμ  805.8 35.7 
2
pσ  289.4 19.4 
2
0hσ  207.9 78.4 
2
hσ  225.5 36.5 
sμ  1791.9 122.6 
2
sσ  8.1 1.7 
rμ  865.9 24.8 
2
rσ  132.1 9.5 
Age 0.74(**) 0.02 
Gender -0.28 0.16 
Residence type 0.65 0.34 
Marital status -0.69(**) 0.05 
 
The demand slope estimated from the model (58.9) is lower than the previous 
research with the same data set (99.9), as reported in Telang (2004). However, the 
interpretation of this key structural parameter has to be careful. It potentially affects both 
the plan choice and the consumption level. Moreover, the latter is affected only when the 
(predicted) satiation point is high enough conditional on the chosen plan. Although it in 
general measure the consumers’ responsiveness towards price change, to extract the 
demand elasticity from it is not straightforward. However, based on its scale, the cell 
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phone users do seem to be more responsive to price change than the traditional land line 
phone users.  
Similarly, the interpretation of the coefficients of the consumer characteristics 
should not be in the usual way. They do not affect the demand directly, but rather, affect 
the prior mean. Over time, their influence reduces as the posteriors depend more and 
more on the signals and realizations. Moreover, considering the scale of the observed 
usage, all the four covariates we use have coefficients close to zero. Although two of 
them are statistically significant, they are still practically insignificant in the sense that 
the change in the usage they could cause is almost none.  
The other parameters in the table measure the learning behavior. The 
shrinking posterior variances of both high-value and low-value usage can be obtained 
from the estimates.  
We conclude the paper by discussing several issues in this research. First, as 
mentioned above, the strategic pricing behavior of the firm is completely ignored. 
Second, our data only include those consumers whole stay with this provider for the 
whole period. We do not have adequate information on those who signed up later or 
cancelled the service earlier. Service cancellation would be particularly interesting to 
explore, since the consumers who were already in the basic plan might find out even that 
plan was not worth the price based on their preferences. This could further illustrate the 
learning behavior. Third, as also discussed in Telang (2004), we do not have reliable 
income data, and this restricts our choice of the utility function. In case the above 
information becomes available in the future, it will be very interesting to extend our study 
to address those issues.  
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